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CAP in Disarray: How to Get Out of the Deadlock?
1. The State of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
When the CAP was established back in 1958, it was a powerful
means for the economic or - even more ambitious - for the politi-
cal integration of the European Community. In more recent years,
however, it has been identified by a growing number of people as
both the origin of mismanaged agricultural markets and of politi-
cal quarrels, both within the Community and with non-member coun-
tries. Some of the well-known results of the CAP are the wine
lakes and butter mountains, resulting from high guaranteed pro-
ducer prices. In the summer of 19 87, they surpassed quotations on
world markets by the factor of two or three in order of magni-
tude. Disposing surplusses on either international or national
markets through export restitutions or subsidies for an inferior
usage (e.g. butter as feed for calves, destination of wine for
fuel-alcohol) has proved to be very costly. The main consequences
of this policy which are seriously aggravated by additional sub-
sidies on the national or even regional level could be summarized
as follows:
-^a-. high and permanently increasing financial burden for consu-
merSj^caused by high food prices;
- the abiis,e/ of subsidies and fraud on the level of production,
manufacturing and foreign trade due to a permanently growing
number of regulations, initiated on the political level to over-
rule market incentives and difficult to control;
- dramatically expanding budget expenditures increasing at aver-
age rate of 20 p.c. between 1975 and 1985. In 1987, outlays for
market regulation only (Guarantee Fund) will amount to 25 bil-
lion ECU. As the overwhelming share is spent on income trans-
fers to foreigners, inferior internal usage or even on the des-
truction of food commodities rather than on investments suppor-
ting economic development, current plans to expand the EC's own
financial resources cannot be justified on economic grounds;
- trade conflicts with non-member countries increasing in number
and severity, which are spread increasingly by these countries- 2 -
to non-agricultural markets where EC-producers have comparative
advantages;
- and, last but not least, high economic costs to the EC economy
(social costs) in the range of 10 to 20 billion ECU per year
(EC 10), depending on the year of estimate, different assump-
tions and estimation procedures . These estimates seem to be
on the lower end as, among others, administrative costs or
costs of democratic machinery and of lobbying are not included.
Another important macro-economic aspect of the CAP is an esti-
mated loss of jobs of up to 1 million (Stoeckel et al., 1987,
p.9).
With respect to the unification of markets as envisaged for 1992,
the achievements of the CAP are equally disappointing. In 1987,
price differentials among member countries were as high as 40
p.c. for major commodities. They do not result from transport
costs but from Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCA's) which main-
tain separate exchange rates, sometimes for single agricultural
commodities. This seems to be a typical example of distorting
competition.
In addition to the grave disadvantages mentioned above, the CAP
has, not surprisingly, missed its main objective, namely the su-
stained increase of farm income per employee, because income sup-
port via higher prices tends to diminish the outflow of labor
from the agricultural sector. Ultimately, price support has led
to higher returns on land, the only immobile production factor.
This has increased land prices which, in turn, has reduced struc-
tural change to larger unities. A comparison with several in-
dustrial markets lacking such a Common Policy indicates that an
unification of markets can be achieved by securing a free flow of
commodities on the basis of undistorted competition rather than
via intricate common or national policies.
1) Some recent estimates can be found in BAE, 1987, p. 107, (e.g.,
for 1978: 11.2 billion ECU; 1983: 8 billion ECU) and in Winters
(1987), which is actually an overview from a number of recent
estimates, a.o. from Anderson/Tyers with 24 billion US-Dollars
(1980 prices) for 1985.2. Reform Proposals - Pretension and Reality
Changes in the CAP that have already been implemented or new pro-
posals could be classified in two broad categories:
reducing supplies by either production quotas (milk and sugar)
or paid land diversion, where the final objective is to main-
tain high producer prices or even to widen the scope for fur-
ther price increases;
- shifting production incentives to crops with a low degree of
self-sufficiency and to renewable raw materials for industrial
use.
Production quotas already in use or their implementation in ad-
ditional markets raise unearned income (economic rents) for pro-
ducers already in business. Highly-qualified farm managers who
would like to expand production because of low production costs
2) are prevented from doing so. Quotas delay structural change ;
the risk of quotas being extended to other commodities, or the
possibility of quotas cut, hamper investment decisions in the
agricultural sector as well as in food-processing firms. As re-
gards quotas, bureaucracy expands at the cost of entrepreneurial
freedom. The frequently observed preference of politicians for
quotas compared to price cuts can be explained easily: support
for a producing sector in the political arena is much easier to
accomplish through higher prices than, for example, through di-
rect payments to farmers for which parliamentiary consent would
be necessary and which would show up in the budget.
Paid land diversion along with persistently high agricultural
commodity prices aggravate distortions of factor use in agri-
culture. Ceteris paribus, intensity of land use will be further
increased, labor productivity and labor income will decline as
economic rents to landowners rise. Land prices will stay at a
high level or will even increase, preventing an accelerated
structural change to larger units. Apart from considerations on
2) For a theoretical and empirical analysis see M. Hartmann and
P. M. Schmitz (1987).- 4 -
allocational inefficiency, structural change may be inevitable in
certain regions on distributional grounds, namely to increase
the income capacity of farms. The distributional effects men-
tioned above, are not quite in accordance with the pretension to
increase income per capita in agriculture, because people em-
ployed in agriculture and land owners are far from being iden-
tical. Up to now, only minor programs on national or regional
levels have been implemented. But as larger or financially more
attractive programs are to be implemented, already now mobility
of both land and labor are likely to be affected negatively.
Forcing the cultivation of commodities of - up to now - a low
degree of self-sufficiency, e.g. rapeseed, sunflowers, soybeans
or peas by even higher incentives for producers than they get for
traditional crops, gives an additional push to economic costs for
the community. Not the degree of self-sufficiency but the rela-
tive competitiveness in comparison to non-member countries should
determine the production structure within the EC. This could be
accomplished by approximating price relations on the internatio-
nal markets and within the EC. Market chances cannot be derived
from low internal production, otherwise one might as well support
the cultivation of bananas or of pineapples. The support of cul-
tivation and usage of renewable resources for industrial use has
the same objective: the substitution of imported raw materials.
That would make sense only if the commodities in question, e.g.,
flax could be produced at lower costs within the Community. How-
ever, this expectation is in contradiction with all results of
specific economic expertise. One exception could be wood, but
only if the high opportunity costs of land, as a consequence of
agricultural protection, could be reduced.
The production of ethanol from renewable resources such as wheat
or sugar beets is another topic which is discussed controversial-
ly, especially since the number of so-called pilot plants in-
3) The average farm size in 1985 was e.g., in the UK 65 hectares,
Germany 16 hectares. Source: EC-census on structure in agri-
culture 1985.- 5 -
creases and the French government has decided to support their
production and usage. Again, the literature on the subject, in-
cluding the latest expertise on behalf of the EC, is unanimous in
4) pointing to a lack in competitiveness of bioethanol production
The most convincing proof for this fact seems to be the call for
subsidies by interest groups outbidding one another with respect
to the amount that is allegedly necessary. The widespread view of
politicians that cultivation of renewable resources could de-
crease income deficits in agriculture cannot be justified. Tech-
nical progress in plant breeding and processing expected for the
future would not change the competitive position of the EC, as
this knowledge is available all around the world and will improve
the cost position of land-rich countries, e.g., in North or South
America.
Summarizing reform proposals, priority is obviously given to the
limitation of, or - more ambitiously - the reduction of surplus-
ses. As this would be curing symptoms rather than causes, not
even here is visible relief in sight. On the other hand, one
could safely assume that because of more regulation, total income
losses of the EC-society will increase further. This is the con-
sequence of high protection which keeps too much capital and
labor within the agricultural sector. Transfers to agriculture,
which amounted to an estimated 56 billion ECU in 1983 (BAE, 1985,
p. 104), are nothing but taxes on the non-agricultural sectors.
As a result, competitiveness deteriorates and growth and expan-
sion of employment opportunities are endangered.
4) This statement has to be qualified with respect to economic-
side conditions relevant for ethanol production. Pursuing a
second-best policy, the EC could compensate alcohol producers
for high agricultural prices (input costs) by making inputs
available at world market prices. No other support, such as
investment subsidies, lower fuel taxes or risk back-up by the
EC or national governments, could be economically justified.
Under these qualifications, on a strictly private basis, with
the risk on investment being left to entrepreneurs, the rise
of an ethanol industry is very unlikely. This assessment is
confirmed by a decline in bioethanol production in the US and
Brazil, countries with very low input costs and even additio-
nal government support.- 6 -
3. Coordination by Markets
A policy in accordance with the principles of a market economy is
characterized in the first place by governments which - on all
administrative levels - limit themselves to institutional policy,
i.e., they keep out of fields where markets will coordinate con-
sumer wishes and producer plans more efficiently. To avoid in-
efficiencies due to competing competences in the decision struc-
ture of a federal community such as the EC, some additional prin-
ciples such as subsidiarity, fiscal equivalence and local accoun-
tability have to be observed. This might be wishful thinking,
given the realities in existing federally-organized states, e.g.,
Germany. However, trying to avoid a renationalization of markets,
the recognition of the above-mentioned principles would seem to
be of utmost relevance for the further development of the EC. As
the establishment and maintenance of unified markets is an impor-
tant field for activities of the Community, e.g., the details of
direct income payments to the agricultural sector repeatedly sug-
gested by different institutions, should be closely supervised by
the EC to avoid competitive distortions between member countries.
But transfers should be financed on the national or regional
level. Efforts to redistribute income between member countries
could be realized more efficiently by direct budgetary assistance
than by more or less unplanned effects of the centralized agri-
cultural price and income-policy presently observed. Following
the principle of subsidiarity, plans for environmental protection
could basically be established, implemented and financed on the
national or local level, strengthening local accountability.
Market forces should not be restricted to the internal market.
Dramatic differences in production costs and consumer preferences
around the world ask for open borders. This remains valid even if
the economy of non-member countries is not ruled by pure market
forces.
Producers should earn their income on markets, i.e., they should
be paid in accordance with their own performance and not arbit-- 7 -
rarily as today, by politicians in the way that the council of
ministers decides on prices and production quotas.
For farmers to be paid according to their performance includes
both the necessity and the freedom to produce the goods and ser-
vices for which consumers are determined to pay. Then commodities
would no longer be stored in warehouses as is now the case, but
food specialities, golfcourses or holiday farms would appear on
the market. In contrast to politicians, bureaucrats and scien-
tists, the creative ideas of entrepreneurial farmers seem to be
unlimited, while the allocation of income by political decision
implies the risk for politicians to be blackmailed and by that,
the democratic system itself to be endangered.
The quantity of agricultural commodities produced, whatever the
quality, place of origin and in whatever organizational type of
farm, results from regionally-diverging producer prices, claims
on income, and chances to earn money outside the agricultural
sector. Payments to farms in so-called disadvantaged areas dis-
criminate against highly productive farms and support high cost
producers. The same is true for tax and subsidy regulations,
e.g., in Germany, discriminating against so-called commercial
farms.
Markets do not regulate everything automatically. Government in-
tervention is justified, if:
the functioning of markets can be improved; or
the failure of markets can be identified.
Governments can improve the functioning of markets by implemen-
ting and controlling quality standards or veterinary laws, thus
preventing the spread of animal epidemics. Market failure means
that externalities can be observed, i.e., if the side-effects of
production processes are not taken into account by market prices.
These could either be costs, i.e., damage to people, or environ-
ment or benefits, for which producers are not paid. Both could be
relevant with respect to agricultural production and will be dis-
cussed later.- 8 -
The transition from a highly dirigistic to a primarily market
oriented agricultural policy has to be carried out smoothly. Not
drastic price cuts at the beginning of the transition but the
correction of too optimistic price expectations of producers have
to be attained in the first place. The prime objective of a
switch in policy is the fast reduction of economic costs. A
qualified farm manager will base his decisions on medium and
long-term economic expectations and not on actual prices. That is
why, for example, the latest decreases in producer prices are not
in contradiction with persistant increases in production as is
frequently argued by politicians and farmers' unions.
EC internal prices should be reduced to world market levels with-
in 5 to 10 years. Prices should be reduced progressively and
should be based on the difference between EC prices and a 5-year
moving average of international quotations. To make the policy
shift credible, a binding, long-term commitment by the EC should
be delivered at the new GATT-Round. The proposal includes that -
at the beginning - price reductions would be greater for commodi-
ties such as milk and sugar with above average protection. Be-
cause the share of the EC in these markets is very large, price
increases for these commodities on the international markets
could also be expected to be above average, as lower price ex-
pectations for EC producers will lead to rapidly shrinking sur-
plusses. Parallel to this process, policy-induced trade flows
such as high imports of grain substitutes to the EC will be
greatly diminished.
Monetary Compensatroy Amounts leading to severe allocational dis-
tortions between member countries should be reduced rapidly and
automatically. The jumble of administrative regulations will
simply no longer apply and become unnecessary. This would be
valid for quotas on production, preferential import regulations
for beef or the "voluntary" export self-restrained agreement with
Thailand on tapioca. Similarily, import levies and export resti-
tutions would become ineffective or unnecessary. Consequently,
administrative activities and the administration itself could be
reduced substantially on both the EC and national level. Remai-- 9 -
ning issues are a stock policy which could contribute to securing
supplies in the event of a food crisis and the permanent improve-
ment of market-efficiency as mentioned above. By opening the bor-
ders of the EC, price instability on international agricultural
markets would be substantially reduced.
As they undermine the price policy suggested above, subsidies on
investment should be abolished instantly. Insofar as the same is
true for the majority of structural policy measures on the natio-
nal level, they should be suspended successively. Regional subsi-
dies are paid to reduce present or future income differences. A
growing number of analysts on theoretical as well as on empirical
reasons doubt their effectiveness in improving the interregio-
nal allocation of resources. As practical experience, e.g., in
Italy, points in the same direction, those programs should be
discontinued or, at least, basically reconsidered. In the light
of the proposed price policy, this seems to be especially neces-
sary for programs which primarily benefit the agricultural sector
such as the EC-program for mediterranian countries. Otherwise the
aim of reducing intersectoral distortions by a revised agricul-
tural price policy would remain impossible to reach.
The implementation of a fundamentally revised common and national
agricultural policy as outlined above might come unexpected for
economic agents. Investments in machines and buildings might
prove suboptimal at a later date. Because of that, producers
could get direct income payments in relation to lost profits
Payments have to be tied to present farm managers; they should
not be paid for more than 15 years and only up to an age of 65.
For farmers discontinuing their farm business before retirement
age, the income payments could be capitalized for the respective
number of years. Following these principles, allocational dis-
tortions between member countries could be avoided even if pay-
5) Riiter (1987); Soltwedel, Bothe, Krieger-Boden (all 1987),
Hallettet al. (1973) .
6) For a detailed discussion of this kind of program, see
Koester/Tangermann (1976) .- 10 -
ments were to differ between countries. Intersectoral allocation
would improve rapidly as land prices and rents decrease and
structural change accelerates. Proposals for direct income pay-
7) ments by the EC-Commission do not meet these requirements. The
first of the two alternatives suggested (EC-payments) would be
payments to badly-managed farms or those with natural disadvan-
tages, i.e., high cost producers. This would only hinder struc-
tural change and increase economic costs.
The second proposal is about direct payments to farmers on the
national level without a time limit. Again, these payments would
give incentives to farmers to remain on their farms, keeping land
prices high. Classifying the latter kind of payments as measures
on purely social reasons cannot be accepted because of strong
negative effects on international as well as on intersectoral
allocation. No rationale seems conceivable for the allocation of
special transfers to farmers on social grounds. In the case of
social distress, the same rules as for other members of the so-
ciety should apply. The only relevant condition for payments
would be personal necessity.
4. Consequences
A reform of the CAP as discussed above would rapidly reduce bud-
getary outlays and lower consumer prices. Because of presently
observable price differences, the severity of consequences for
producers would differ between member countries. Producers' in-
comes would decrease only slightly in the short run as parallel
cost reductions are likely to be achievable. On the other hand,
medium-term income expectations would immediately be revised
downwards. Prices for land and land rental would decline, but a
slump to extremely low levels seems unlikely as elasticity of
demand will probably be relatively high. It could even be in-
creased, if restrictions on transfers of land, which are quite
severe in several member countries, were eliminated. Neverthe-
7) See Agra-Europe No. 18/87 (4.5.87).- 11 -
less, one cannot exclude the insolvency of quite a number of
farms because of their heavy indebtedness. This has to be accep-
ted as something normal in market economies. Farmers remaining in
business have to decide on their long-term chances. Highly-
qualified farm managers without debt problems will take the
chance of lower land prices and expand by buying or renting addi-
tional land. So, in general, structural change in the direction
of larger farms either full time or, part-time farming, will gain
pace.
As a further consequence of lower agricultural prices, intensity
of land use is likely to decline. This could halt the process of
intensification in new member countries adapting right now to
higher EC-prices, and reverse the long-term trend in the other
countries. Marginal land would be idled. If its economic use for
forestry is not profitable, a truly natural landscape would
evolve to the benefit of ecologists and environmentalists.
5. Externalities of Farming
Smelling the odour of freshly-applied liquid manure or watching
friendly cows on a green meadow, one sensually realizes that re-
lations between farmers and consumers are not limited to market
events. Farming has side effects not included in the market pro-
cess. With respect to the suggested change in price policy, some
possible externalities of present and suggested policies will be
identified, and government intervention conceivable to enhance
market solutions will be discussed.
Coming to negative effects first, of which nitrification of
ground water seems to be the most urgent problem, one could
safely assume that lower agricultural prices will reduce the
amount of nitrate applied and thus reach the ground water. To the
extent that flows of ground water cross regional or national bor-
ders only to a limited amount, following the principle of subsi-
diarity, government action to solve the remaining externality
should be taken on the national or even regional level. This ar-- 12 -
gument is in accordance with the fact that scarcity of ground
water as well as standards on health and environmental protection
differ between regions or states and, therefore, should have con-
sequences on resource allocation between member countries. Govern-
ments trying to reduce spoilage of groundwater have to decide
first who the owner of groundwater is to be, i.e., how to allo-
cate property rights. Because of economic reasons and giving pre-
t
ference to environmental protection, one should follow the prin-
cipal of (physical) causality. Because they cause the externali-
ty, farmers should bear the costs at least in the first round. As
increased costs on the producer level are partly passed on to the
consumer, the ultimate shares of consumers and producers in costs
of scarcity of groundwater would be determined by markets. What
then remains is the all but trivial technical problem relating
groundwater spoilage to individual producers. As long as a con-
sistent establishment of field data is not feasible, a tax on
nitrogen could be a temporary solution. As.the aim of the tax is
not an increase in government income, it should be repaid as a
lump sum related to area.
Another field of conflicting interests could be allocated between
farming and conservation or renaturalization of certain biotopes
for ecological reasons. Again, with lower agricultural prices
marginal land will be idled, reducing negative external effects
on the ecological sphere. But, in such a densely populated area
as the EC, conflicts will remain or even be aggravated. Parallel
to arguments outlined above, the question arises as to who is
going to pay for the scarcity of land. Farmers, because they are
not compensated for restrictions on land use, or environmenta-
lists? Because of well-established property rights on behalf of
farmers, one tends to keep the rights with farmers. This view is
supported by the fact that land is immobile and, therefore, far-
mers - other than industrial producers - cannot avoid costs of
environmental protection, e.g., local claims on restricted land
use. With respect to the appropriate level of action, one has to
ask whether environmentalists, the group who benefits primarily
should negotiate and pay for contracts with farmers on the localBifeliothek
deslnsHhitefurWeltwirtschaft - 13 -
level, or should governments pay? A clear-cut answer is diffi-
cult. Solving the conflict on a strictly private basis such that
users of a rare environment pay for their benefits proves to be
unjust, because certain side effects of environmentalists' ac-
tion, e.g., the protectionof endangered species, is to the bene-
fit of all members of society. Therefore, the protection of cer-
tain biotopes could have the character of a public good. The de-
cision will depend on the rareness of the environmental object to
be protected, and this, on the other hand, should determine the
level of government which has to pay for the public good.
An increasing number of people, politicians and interest groups
claim that farming - the way it is done today - has positive side
effects. The message is that farming produces the main ingre-
dients to civilized regions, i.e., the landscape with a certain
farming structure and small villages characterized by farmsteads;
It is demanded that farmers should be paid for preserving this
cultural value, giving the present countryside itself the quality
of a public good. If this could be ascertained, the new agricul-
tural policy with structural change and the likelihood of land
being idled would have negative effects on visitors to rural
areas.
To prove these propositions seems hardly possible but, rather
than asserting that consumers prefer the landscape as it is, they
should be given the choice. It seems quite likely that, in
densely populated Western Europe, quite a large number of people
would prefer a landscape with more forests or just more area left
to itself rather than the intensively used agricultural area.
Therefore, general payments to farmers to preserve the landscape
cannot be justified. On the other hand, one should not exclude
the possibility that people would like to preserve certain unique
landscapes such as valleys or mountain areas which could be en-
dangered by a new agricultural policy. Therefore recurring on the
principles of subsidiarity and fiscal equivalence, local authori-
ties should be enabled by the EC or national governments to share
with visitors their costs of preserving the landscape. Only as an
exception, given a consent on the national or EC level to pre-- 14 -
serve an unique landscape, financial support should be given by
the EC or national governments. In any case, preserving a lands-
cape does not necessarily mean preserving the farm structure or
the combination of crops cultivated today.
But this is exactly what some governments, especially that in
Germany, demand and what seems to b,e increasingly accepted on the
EC level: the preservation of the farm structure by supporting
the small family farm ("peasant" family farm), Besides the im-
mense economic costs resulting from such a policy, the demand
cannot be justified and would not meet the interests of the pea-
sants themselves. To classify every farmstead as being of cul-
tural value seems to be arbitrary. If one looks at the develop-
ment of small villages during the recent decades, the number of
farms has decreased rapidly. Many farmhouses have been bought and
restored by people with other occupations, preserving or even
improving the image of many small villages. Conflicts should be
settled at the local level and are not a case for subsidies on
the national or supranational level. With respect to environ-
mental or social aims, the superiority of small family farms can-
not be proved either.
6. Objections to a Fundamental Reform
Not only do farmers personally concerned object to the reform
proposals as outlined above. Politicians qlaim the disregard of
important social aims and consider such a reform not feasible.
That might be true as long as:
farmers who are severely hindered by bureaucratic regulations
do not protest and bring about a shift in the publicly re-
cognized position of farmers' unions;
consumers and taxpayers do not realize that butter mountains
or wine lakes are not the necessary supplements of a CAP, but
the result of a political mismanagement; and
- other industries, or respectively their advocates, do not rea-
lize that the high protection of the farm sector is an attack
on their own competitiveness due to higher taxes, distorted-15 :-•
exchange rates and impaired trade relations to non-member
countries.
If these conditions change, politicians supporting the ideas out-
lined above, will appear on the political market quite rapidly.
Another objection frequently brought up in the public debate re-
lates to social aims. It states that a reform of the CAP increa-
sing the outflow of people from the agricultural sector would
merely increase the army of unemployed. This argument postulates
that market forces which could reduce the income of entrepreneurs
and ultimately drive entrepreneurs and employees out of business
should not apply to farmers. This argument seems not to be well
founded, particularly on social grounds, as presently a major
share of transfers to agriculture by high prices is paid by low
income groups, while not all farmers are poor.
Without doubt, the implementation of a new agricultural policy
would have been easier 15 years ago, when rates of unemployment
were low. However, preserving jobs which are not competitive
through subsidies and a high protection on borders to non-member
countries, taxing consumers directly is a backward-looking
strategy. Taxing the non-agricultural sectors leads to a loss of
jobs - which would otherwise have been competitive - by a number
which by far surpasses the number of jobs preserved in agricul-
ture. A GAP in accordance with the principles of a market economy
would halt the waste of human resources, taxpayers' money and
scarce capital. Trade relations to competing countries could be
greatly improved, which would in the first place benefit the EC
itself.
Financial resources saved by a reform of the CAP on the one hand
should alleviate burdens on taxpayers and consumers and should be
used on the other hand for investment in infrastructure and educa-
tion. This applies in particular to the new member countries.
Here, increasing agricultural prices give the wrong signals for
economic development. Apart from government policy, collective
bargaining partners on the labor market could improve conditions
for growth in regions with structural deficits. Keeping wages on- 16 -
a lower level where labor capacity is in excess would attract
more private capital and by that reduce outmigration.
Conclusion
In spite of the foreseeable personal hardship for people directly
concerned, an alternative to a reform of the CAP along the lines
outlined above cannot be seen. To reduce income losses to the EC
society and to improve the conditions for growth and for more
employment opportunities, the number of farmers, particularly
fulltime farmers, will have to decline further. The structural
change in agriculture has to gain pace, at least temporarily, to
achieve farm sizes which are competitive on international mar-
kets. Negative effects of farming on the environment will be
greatly reduced; for remaining conflicts solutions oh the local
level should have precedence.
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